Abstract
Introduction
The global financial crisis triggered a large number of efforts on different types of systemic risk (cf. Allen and Gale, 2000; Acharya, 2009) , including macrofinancial imbalances, exogenous aggregate shocks and contagion risk. While systemic risk is oftentimes divided into cyclical and cross-sectional components (Borio, 2011) , a plethora of articles have focused on the latter of the two, i.e., the interconnectedness of financial systems. This paper postulates, and tests, the utility of measuring portfolio overlap, as well as tests to what extent it helps in identifying risks at the country level.
Many authors calculate from market prices the quantiles of the estimated loss probability distribution of a bank, conditional on the occurrence of an extreme event in the financial market. Examples of articles trying to capture systemic risk from market prices include Acharya et al. (2010) , Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) , Brownlees and Engle (2012) , Acharya et al. (2012) , Banulescu and Dumitrescu (2015) and Hautsch et al. (2014) . The above studies rely on a bivariate approach, which allow calculating the risk of an institution conditional on another or on a reference market but does not address the issue of how risks are transmitted between different institutions in a multivariate framework. To address the multivariate nature of systemic risk, a large number of studies have made use of correlation network models (see, e.g., Lorenz et al. (2009) ; Battiston et al. (2012) ). Some early studies include Billio et al. (2012) and Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) , after which extensions by Barigozzi and Brownlees (2014) and Ahelegbey et al. (2016) introduce stochastic graphical models.
In contrast to the literature on correlation networks that targets the dependence structure in market prices, this paper measures correlation in network structures. As pointed out by Brunetti et al. (2015) , correlations in network structures hold promise for assessing common exposures and complement direct linkages. Giudici et al. (2017) test measures of common exposures in the context of market prices, and does not put forward a generalized approach to this testing framework. This paper sheds additional light on this problem, in the context of national interbank markets. Further, this paper provides a test between direct and common exposures as a measure of risks prior to financial crises with a general purpose tool, RiskRank. A large number of studies have assessed network structures of interbank markets using the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) data set, including Garratt et al. (2011) , Giudici and Spelta (2016) , McGuire and Tarashev (2006) , Minoiu and Reyes (2013) .
The methodological contribution of this paper is to formally compare classical networks and correlation based networks, using appropriate predictive comparisons. Using the correlation as a measure of proximity in a multivariate framework, we provide measures of funding composition and portfolio similarities. From an applied viewpoint, we shed further light on the interpretation of country bilateral financial flows data, contained in the BIS statistics. We also combine these measures with banking crises, in a standard early-warning setup, in order to evaluate whether and to what extent they are related to the build-up of imbalances prior to crisis events.
Results suggest the predictive power of direct linkages is clearly outperformed by the other ways of defining relationships. While linkages based upon common exposures and a combination of direct and common exposures perform equally well in forecasting crisis episodes, the predictive power obtained combining the two type of network is superior for a certain parameter range. This highlights the importance of common exposures. From an economic point of view, this clearly shows that common exposures, or socalled funding/portfolio composition overlap, indeed are channels of contagion and should be accounted for when measuring systemic risk.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the portfolio overlap methods used and Section 3 the crisis signaling and signal evaluation methods adopted. While Section 4 describes the empirical exercise in the network structure, Section 5 presents the results of comparing our exposure measures in terms of performance in signaling a crisis through the RiskRank measure. Finally, Section 6 contains some concluding remarks and future research directions.
2.

Networks and portfolio overlap methodology
This section presents the methods used for estimating portfolio overlap. We can represent a network by the means of a graph G=(V;E) consisting of a set V of $n$ vertices and a set E of m edges. A weight wi,j, (with i,j=1,...,m) can possibly be associated to each edge (i;j) and then a weighted (or valued) graph is defined.
After the recent crisis, it has been argued that network theory will enhance the understanding of financial systems, systemic risk, and the comprehension of the factors causing failures in financial markets. Usually, the financial systems are approached studying the connections among financial institutions. This is done through measuring banking liabilities and claims because credit interlinkages are inherently important for propagating, absorbing or magnifying shocks. Even if a topology of a network is known to play a major role in robustness against shocks, the lack of bilateral data have prevented the systematical investigation of the topological properties of the international financial network. Always when data are missing or confidential, correlation based networks seem to be a better alternative to classical network models. While the literature has focused on dependence structures among market prices, the focus in this paper is on correlations in network structures.
Correlation networks can be used when analyzing the structure of pairwise correlations among a set of N time series. The proximity measure is defined as follows:
( 1) where Ci,j is the correlation coefficient between the two time series si and sj in a given time window. The topological analysis of the international financial network needs to be developed. In order to do so we will use the following procedure: we will associate different the time series with the different nodes of a network. Each pair of nodes can be thought to be connected by an edge, with weights that can be related to the correlation coefficient between the two corresponding time series. A proximity network of n nodes can be derived by its associated n × n matrix of proximities D a weighted adjacency matrix, with elements di,j described by equation 1. Now the network is obtained and the following step is to describe a node centrality with an interconnectedness summary measure. This task is done to describe and to provide an indicator that can act as a measure of systemic importance.
In this paper, the set of nodes represent countries, while the set of edges depends on value that defines the link. The aim of the paper is to study and to compare networks of direct flows between countries' banking sectors with common exposure networks based on correlations between streams of loans. A link between two countries in a direct network represents a flow of funds, in millions of dollars, between a borrower and a lender. A link in a common exposure network, instead, measures the similarity between the funding composition or between the portfolio allocations of two countries, depending on whether in-flows or out-flows are used to compute the correlations. While in a direct network the links are directional, from a lender to a Page 1358 borrower, in common exposure networks they are undirected, and they are computed starting from the correlation between the in-flows and out-flows of a country with respect to all other countries.
Crisis signaling and signal evaluation methodology
It is possible to use standard approaches from crisis signaling with the purpose of testing to what extent direct and indirect exposures affects the overall level of stress in the banking sector. Crisis signaling and Earlywarning models are used to divide economies into precrisis and tranquil ones. This will result into a twoclass classification problem, which is a generic problem formulation in machine learning. We are aiming for a model that separates vulnerable and tranquil classes to discriminate between them by estimating the probability of being in a vulnerable state. It is also important to take into consideration the time-series dimension, when testing the predictive power of the models. Therefore, recursive real-time out-of-sample tests to assess performance will be taken. This implies that a new model is created at each quarter using the information available then. We need also to consider publication lags and the information in a realistic manner.
Table 1. A contingency matrix
In order to have comparable results, we will use the evaluation framework for early-warning models in (Sarlin, 2013) , and mimicking an ideal leading indicator for observation n (where n=1,2,...,N) and forecast horizon h, meaning that we have a binary indicator that is one during vulnerable periods and zero otherwise. For detecting events Cn, we will use a continuous measure indicating membership in a vulnerable state . We will then change it into a binary prediction Bn that takes the value one if pn exceeds a specified threshold and zero otherwise. The relationship between the prediction Bn and the ideal leading indicator Cn can then be summarized into a contingency matrix, as found in Table 1 . In terms of the elements of the contingency matrix, we can differentiate between two different types of classification errors that a decision maker may be concerned with: missing crises and issuing false alarms. The next step is to define the concepts of usefulness and relative usefulness for the classification performance (as found in Sarlin, 2013) . The process will define type I errors (the share of missed crises to the frequency of crises, i.e. T1=FN/(FN+TP)) and type II errors (the share of issued false alarms to the frequency of tranquil periods, i.e. T2=FP/(TN+FP)). The following step is to obtain the policymakers' relative preference between type I and II errors (μ) to account for the potentially imbalanced costs of errors and the unconditional probabilities of crises P1 and tranquil periods P2 to account for the potential difference in the size of the two classes. Based on these values, we can define the loss function as:
( 2) The absolute usefulness of the model can be specified by comparing it to using the best guess of a policymaker (always or never signaling depending on class frequency and preferences):
The final step is to calculate Ur and to compare the absolute usefulness of the model to the absolute usefulness of a model with perfect performance L(μ)=0 We also strive to assess the predictive performance through calculating standard measures from the classification and machine learning literature, using the area under the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve (AUC). These measures take into consideration the preferences of a policymaker as well as more general-purpose measures to assess model performance. Other performance measures to be used in assessing the model include: 
Network data calculations
This section compares the use of direct exposures with common exposures in a predictive model of systemic banking crises. In short, we let vulnerability pass-through networks, where links are defined as Page 1359 direct and common exposures, and compare their predictive performance. To start with, we introduce crisis signaling as a task as well as an evaluation exercises around the task. Then, we move ahead to an empirical investigation of European crises.
For networks, the main data source in this paper is statistics from the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). The International Banking Statistics comprises consolidated banking statistics (CBS). CBS capture worldwide consolidated claims of banks headquartered in many countries, including claims of their own foreign affiliates but excluding interoffice positions. The dataset above is based upon measures used by banks from their internal risk management systems. This dataset typically include data on off-balance sheet exposures (risk transfers, guarantees and credit commitments).
We employ the consolidated banking statistics on ultimate risk basis that are based on the country where the ultimate risk or obligor resides, after taking into account risk transfers. We have also taken into consideration the fact that the statistics capture worldwide consolidated positions of the banks thus, the CBS reporting area is not synonymous of the location of the banking offices within the dataset. A reporting country should consolidate the positions of all banking entities controlled by a parent institution located in the reporting country, thus including banking entities which are actually domiciled elsewhere. With reporting institutions we mean the financial institutions whose business is to receive deposits, or close substitutes for deposits, and to grant credits or invest in securities on their own account. In this way, the set of reporting institutions should include not only commercial banks but also savings banks, credit unions or cooperative credit banks, as well as other financial credit institutions. There is a complicated aspect in the fact that a number of countries do not report their statistics on the asset side (out-flows); we have 15 fully reporting countries and more than 240 that do not report in our dataset. Another complicating factor is found in the time series with varying starting dates and of missing values. Therefore we split the analysis of the in-and out-flows in two different databases. We restrict the analysis to the 33 largest economies in the funding side (for which the received loans sum up to last 100000 billion dollars for the period from 1998 to 2013). The time period starts from the third quarter of 1998 (Q3--1998) to the last quarter of 2013 (Q4--2013) . We are forced to use only 15 reporting countries on the investment side, from the third quarter of 1998 (Q3--1998) Notice that the proposed strategy is consistent with Basel III regulation that look separately at the lending and borrowing sides of banks' balance sheet in the process of evaluating the systemic importance (Board, 2013) .
Results -Comparing networks with RiskRank
In this section, we compare direct and indirect exposures with the RiskRank measure (Mezei and Sarlin, 2016) . RiskRank uses two inputs: individual risk for a set of economies measured by an earlywarning model and interconnectedness across these economies. Essentially, this allows measuring the vulnerability of an individual economy, accounting for both domestic risk as well as risk stemming from exposures to other economies. In this exercise, the early-warning model follows the approach in (Holopainen and Sarlin, 2016) . For an early-warning model, we need two types of data: crisis events and vulnerability indicators. The crisis events are based upon the IMF database by \cite{laeven2013systemic}, while the vulnerability indicators used include most common measures of widespread imbalances, such as excessive credit growth, excessive increases in stock and house prices, GDP growth, loans to deposits and debt service ratio, as well as more structural indicators, such as government debt, current account deficits and inflation. We use a standard logit model with 14 macro-financial indicators for 15 European economies and a forecast horizon of 5--12 quarters prior to crisis events, as is common in the literature. The network dimension is measured with BIS International Banking Statistics in three ways: direct, indirect (common exposures) and combined exposures. This provides ample means to compare the three types of networks.
RiskRank provides a risk measure that combines measures of individual risk and interconnectedness. In principle, it is nothing else than an aggregation (4) where c is the evaluated node and xc is its associated node value. In this case, the nodes are countries and their values crisis probabilities. Further, I(ci,cj) stands for the link between nodes i and j and v(ci) stands for the Shapley-index (average contribution of fixed element xi in any subset).
In the following the results of the RiskRank comparisons are given (Tables 2-9 ). Note that the tables reports recursive out-of-sample performance for the direct network with a forecast horizon of 5-12 quarters. The table reports in columns the following measures to assess the overall performance of the models: preferences (μ), optimal threshold (τ), absolute (Ua) and relative (Ur) Table 9 . Predictive performance of the combined network for out-flows.
Conclusion and future work
Measuring portfolio similarity is a central task when modeling systemic risk and interconnectedness in financial systems, particularly for complementing measures based upon direct exposures. Systemic risk, in itself, concerns the risks posed by balance sheet relationships and interdependencies among players in a system or market, where the failure of a single entity can cause a cascading failure, which could potentially bring down an entire system or market. These balance sheet linkages can be represented by a network that describes the mutual relationships between the different economical agents involved. In this paper, we have focused on measuring portfolio overlap, and assessing the utility of common exposures as a channel for transmission effects. In our contribution we have also shown that correlation network models that aim at capturing the multivariate network structure provide suitable means for representing the indirect dimension of systemic risk through common exposures. We have combined our proposed measures with banking crises data, in order to assess whether and to what extent they are related to the build-up of imbalances prior to crisis events. The exercise clearly shows that common exposures are an important channel of contagion and should be accounted for when measuring systemic risk.
Future work should cover general development of the RiskRank approach to also incorporate dynamic iterations and feedback effects. For the specific purpose in this paper, one could also think of various other types of network linkages that could be used for measuring the efficacy of transmission channels.
